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Abstract 
I examine whether education increases voter turnout 
and makes better voters using an exogenous variation 
in education induced by an extension of Indonesia's 
school term length, which fits a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design. The longer school year increases 
education, but I do not find evidence that education 
makes people more likely to vote in elections or 
changes whether they consider political candidates' 
religion, ethnicity, or gender important when they 
vote. If anything, education seems to make voters 
more likely to think candidates' development 
programs are important. 
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1. Introduction 
Educated citizens are more likely to vote in elections, many studies show 
(Campbell et al., 1960; Persson, 2015; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980), but 
few papers look at the relationship in developing countries.
1
 What happens 
when people in developing countries, whose democracies are typically young 
and average educational attainment is low, become more educated? Are they 
more likely to engage in politics and vote in elections? Do they become better 
voters? 
The correlation is well established but it remains a question whether 
the relationship is causal.
2
 Theoretically, education increases political 
participation if education endows citizens with knowledge about political 
systems, means to communicate with politicians and to voice their interests, 
beliefs to influence policy making, and skills to evaluate political candidates’ 
characters and campaign promises (Jackson, 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 
1993; Verba et al, 1995).
3
 But, they may also positively correlate if education 
captures the effects of parental characteristics, socio-economic status, 
intelligence, and personal preferences—if some observed- and unobserved 
                                                          
1
 In the U.S., for example, the relationship that voter turnout increases in education 
holds for white or black Americans, local or national elections, and self-reported or 
public recoded votes (see Sondheimer and Green (2010) and the papers cited herein). 
2
 In the literature on voter turnout, education is considered one of the determinants 
(see, for example, Fumagalli and Narciso (2012)). See Persson (2015) for a review of 
the literature. 
3
 Another theory is education increases social status and expands social network in 
society, which increase political participation (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry, 1996). 
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factors change both education and voter turnout (Jennings and Niemi, 1974; 
Langton and Jennings, 1968; Luskin, 1990; Mondak and Halperin, 2008). For 
example, if parents who discuss the importance of civic duties at home when 
their children grow up are also parents who value the education of their 
children, the parents’ idiosyncrasies cause political participation, not the 
education of the children.  
Recent empirical papers, which use better research designs and exploit 
natural experiments to generate exogenous changes in education, find mixed 
evidence on whether education increases voter turnout. Using the Perry 
Preschool and the Student Teacher Achievement Ratio randomized 
experiments in the U.S., Sondheimer and Green (2010) find education 
increases voter turnout; but Solis (2013), using eligibility criteria for student 
loans in Chile that fit a regression discontinuity design, do not (he does not 
find education makes better voters either). Papers that use instrumental 
variable techniques also find mixed results: Education increases voter turnout 
in the U.S. (Dee, 2004; Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos, 2004) and Nigeria 
(Larreguy and Marshall, 2015), but it does not in the U.K. (Milligan, Moretti, 
and Oreopoulos, 2004) and Germany (Siedler, 2010).
4
 One of the few papers 
                                                          
4
 However, Berinsky and Lenz (2011), using the Vietnam draft as an instrumental 
variable, do not find education increases voter turnout in the U.S. Using compulsory 
schooling laws in 15 European countries as instrumental variables, Borgonovi, 
d’Hombres, Hoskins (2010) do not find education increases voter turnout either, but it 
makes better-informed voters. The other papers use compulsory schooling laws, child 
labor laws, or school expansions as instrumental variables. Papers that use matching 
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that look at the relationship between education and political participation in 
developing countries is Larreguy and Marshall (2015): Using school 
expansion in Nigeria as an instrument for education, they find education 
increases voter turnout, community participation, and people’s interest in 
politics. 
Even if the relationship in developed countries is not causal, it may be 
in developing countries if the effects of education are heterogeneous. One, 
people in developing countries are on average less educated than people in 
developed countries; two, developing countries' democracies are younger and 
more fragile; three, institutions and law enforcement in developing countries 
are weak. Returns to education in developed countries may be low, but they 
are high in developing countries; returns to political reforms in developing 
countries may be also high—education, therefore, may have heterogeneous 
effects on political participation. 
In this paper, I look at the case of Indonesia: I examine the effects of 
education on political participation using an exogenous variation in education 
induced by a longer school year in the late 1970s. In the middle of the 1978 
school year, the Government of Indonesia announced that the ongoing school 
year was extended by six months, a change that caught everyone by surprised 
and stirred a controversy among representatives in the lower house and 
officials of the parents association. Children who were born in 1971 or earlier, 
                                                                                                                                                        
strategies also find mixed results (Kam and Palmer, 2008; Mayer, 2011; Persson, 
2014).  
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entered primary school in 1978 or earlier, and did not drop out of school 
before 1978 experienced the longer school year (most children in Indonesia 
entered primary school the year they turned seven years old); children who 
were born in 1972 or later did not (they had yet to enter primary school). The 
probability of experiencing the longer school year therefore discontinues 
between the 1971 and 1972 birth cohorts, which fits a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design. I use this discontinuity to generate an exogenous 
variation in education, whose relationship with political participation I then 
examine to identify its effects on political participation. 
I find education positively correlates with political participation, but I 
do not find evidence that the relationship is causal. I do not find evidence that 
education makes people more likely to vote in elections; moreover, I find little 
evidence that education affects how they vote: Education does not seem to 
change whether voters consider political candidates' religion, ethnicity, look, 
or gender important when they vote. If anything, education makes voters more 
likely to think that political candidates' development programs are important. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. One, I provide 
estimates of the causal effects of education on political participation using a 
regression discontinuity design, an empirical strategy that resembles 
randomized experiments. Two, I examine the relationship in a developing 
country, which complements papers in the literature that have focused on the 
relationship in developed countries. Three, I use data that have various 
measures of political participation and behavior, which allow me to examine 
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the effects of education on not only voter turnout but also factors voters 
consider when they vote. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the longer school 
year, empirical strategy, and data; Section 3 discusses the results; Section 4 
concludes. 
 
 
2. The longer school year, empirical strategy, and data 
2.1. The longer school year in Indonesia 
In the late 1970s, Daoed Yusuf, the then Minister of Education and Culture 
under Suharto’s administration, changed the start of school years from the 
month of January to the month of July that led to a one-time longer school 
year.
5
 (School years in Indonesia used to start in January and end in December 
the same year.) In mid-1978, in the middle of the 1978 school year, he 
announced that, to synchronize school years with government-budget years, 
school years would start in July and end in June the following year, and that 
the change would be effective immediately starting the following school year. 
He did this by requiring schools to extend the 1978 school year for six months 
so that the 1978 school year that would have ended in December 1978 was 
extended until June 1979. He announced the change without much planning: 
He did not issue major directives on what schools needed to do during the 
extension; he did not require teachers to deliver new materials either; he just 
                                                          
5
 See Tempo (1978), Government of Indonesia (1985), and MPKRI (1978). 
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asked them to revise lessons covered in 1978 during the six-month extension, 
which made the change of the start of school years a one-time longer school 
year. (From then on, school years have started in July and ended in June the 
following year.) Children who were in school in 1978 remained in the same 
grade until June 1979—they experienced the longer school year; children who 
entered primary school in 1979 or later did not. 
 There is therefore a discontinuity in the probability of whether children 
in the 1978-1979 school cohorts experienced the longer school year. Because 
most children in Indonesia entered primary school the year they turned seven 
years old, this discontinuity corresponds with a discontinuity between the 
1971 and  1972 birth cohorts. If a person was born in 1971 or earlier, entered 
primary school in 1978 or earlier, and did not drop out of school before 1978, 
she experienced the longer school year in 1978-1979; if she was born in 1972 
or later so that she entered primary school in 1979 or later, she did not 
experience the longer school year. 
Papers in the literature find mixed evidence on whether longer school 
years increase student performance and educational attainment (see, for 
example, Pischke (2007), Hansen (2008), and Fitzpatrick, Grissmer, and 
Hastedt (2011)), but Parinduri (2014) show that the longer school year in 
Indonesia increased educational attainment by 0.7 of a year and the probability 
of completion of high school by more than 20 percent. Parinduri (2014) does 
not formally explore the mechanisms how the longer school year increases 
education but suggested possibilities include (1) teachers had more time to 
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teach weak students, which lowered grade repetition; (2) because children, 
especially those who lived in rural areas, did better in school, the parents 
raised their valuation of their children’s education; (3) the longer school year 
gave more opportunities to girls, which lowered grade repetition among girls 
and increased their educational attainment. 
 
2.2. Empirical strategy 
 I use the discontinuity in the probability of experiencing the longer 
school year between the 1971 and 1972 birth cohorts (conditional on year of 
birth) as an instrumental variable in a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) 
design. I implement the fuzzy RD design to estimate the effects of education 
on political participation using equation-by-equation two-stage least-square 
regressions as follows:  
  𝐷𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑖) + 𝜀1𝑖 (1) 
 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝛿?̂?𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑖) + 𝜀2𝑖 (2)  
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝜃𝑒𝑑?̂?𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑖) + 𝜀3𝑖 (3)  
where 𝐷𝑖 is an indicator equals one if person i experienced the longer school 
year and zero otherwise; 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 equals one if she is a member of the 
older cohorts, i.e., she was born in 1971 or earlier; 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 is her educational 
outcome such as her educational attainment or an indicator of whether she 
completed high-school; 𝑦𝑖 is a measure of her political participation; and 
f(yobi) is a polynomial function of , yobi, her year of birth. The first-stage 
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regression, Equation (1), generates ?̂?𝑖, an exogenous variation in the 
probability of experiencing the longer school year; the second-stage regression 
of 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 on ?̂?𝑖 predicts 𝑒𝑑?̂?𝑖, an exogenous variation in education induced by 
the longer school year; the third-stage regression of 𝑦𝑖 on 𝑒𝑑?̂?𝑖 identifies 𝜃, 
the effects of education on political participation. 
Identification using this RD design relies on the assumption that 
nobody could precisely control which side of the discontinuity she is on (Lee 
and Lemeriux, 2010) (i.e., parents could not precisely determine the years 
their children entered primary schools, in particular whether the children 
entered in 1978 or 1979), which, I shall argue, a plausible assumption. One, 
the government announced the policy in the middle of the 1978 school year 
when most children in the 1971 birth cohort had entered primary school—an 
announcement that caught parents and lawmakers by surprise and caused a 
controversy—which ruled out any attempts by parents to send their children to 
primary school at a younger age if they thought the longer school year was 
good for their children (children who were born in 1972 had yet to enter 
primary school). Two, the longer school year was immediately implemented, 
during the ongoing school year, which decreased the likelihood that parents 
changed their decision on, for example, whether to send their children to pre-
school. Three, the children were born six or seven years earlier; the parents, 
therefore, had no way to plan when to conceive their children just to exploit 
the policy change to their children’s advantage whatever it might be.  
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The RD design also meets the requirement (for the identification of the 
effects of the longer school year on education and political participation) that 
the government implemented no other education policies or political reforms 
when it extended the longer school year in 1978-1979. The SD Inpres, 
Suharto’s school construction program that built primary schools throughout 
the country, was initiated in 1973 (Duflo, 2004) and slowed down in mid-
1980s: The trend lines of the number of schools built and enrollment rates are 
continuous in 1978-1979 and, hence, the SD Inpres program did not 
compromise the identification of the the effects of the longer school year on 
education.
6
 The government announced two policies on compulsory schooling, 
the six- and nine-year compulsory schooling programs, but both were 
announced long after the longer school year in, respectively, 1984 and 1994. 
The government did not do any political reforms in the late 1970s either; 
besides, the people in the sample were still children at the time so that political 
reforms were unlikely to affect their political preferences or attitudes much. 
Some falsification tests I do—two-stage least-square estimations of the 
effects of the longer school year on some educational inputs—show that, if the 
longer school year increases educational attainment, the increase was not 
caused by other policies (see Table 1). Using age as the dependent variable in 
Equation (2), I find the estimates of the effects of the longer school year on 
                                                          
6
 Inpres stands for Instruksi Presiden or Presidential Instruction. Using this decree, the then 
President Suharto expanded access to primary schools in Indonesia by building schools across 
the Indonesian archipelago. 
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age are small economically and insignificant statistically. I do not find 
evidence that the longer school year induced more parents to migrate to urban 
areas in 1978-1979 (for example, to ensure their children attending better 
schools) or reduced the time it took for a one-way trip to schools on average 
(which might happened if, for example, roads were improved or more people 
moved to neighborhood where schools were located); I do not find evidence 
schools changed the number of school-hours per day or the number of students 
per classroom (say, to help children that did not experience the longer school 
year) either.
7
 If 𝛿 in Equation (2) is positive and significant statistically, most 
likely it is the longer school year that increased educational attainment, not 
school starting age, proximity to schools, quality of schools, transportation 
costs, or class size. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
The coefficient of interest is   in Equation (3), which is the effects of 
education on political participation. If education increases political 
participation, we expect   to be positive. If education makes voters vote 
better, we expect   to be positive in regressions in which 𝑦𝑖 is whether voters 
consider political candidates’ quality of development programs important 
when they vote;  is negative in regressions in which 𝑦𝑖 is whether voters 
consider candidates’ religion or gender important. 
                                                          
7
 See Parinduri (2014) for the details of the falsification tests. 
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2.3. Data 
I use the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), a Rand Corporation’s 
longitudinal survey of a representative sample of the Indonesian population.
8
 
To have the largest number of people who completed high school (twelve 
years of education), I use IFLS-4, the fourth wave of the survey. I include the 
1960-1987 birth cohorts: I exclude the 1959 and earlier cohorts because they 
had completed high school in 1978 (if they did not drop out of school earlier); 
I exclude the 1988 or later birth cohorts because they were still in school when 
they were interviewed in 2007. I have about 18 thousands people in the 
sample. 
In the basic specifications, I define 𝐷𝑖, whether person i experienced 
the longer school year, using information on year of birth and education 
history of people in the sample. To find out whether they were in school in the 
1978 school year, I follow the year they were born, the number of times they 
repeated grades, and their educational attainment. The longer school year 
equals one for people who were born in 1971 (so that they entered primary 
school in 1978) if their educational attainment was at least one year of 
education; the same applies for those who were born earlier and they did not 
drop out of school before 1978. The longer school year equals zero for those 
who were born in 1972 or later and those who were born earlier but dropped 
out of school before 1978. 
                                                          
8
 See Frankenberg and Thomas (2000) and Strauss et al. (2009a) for the details of the 
survey. 
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IFLS has information on the year of entry to primary school, which I 
also use to define the longer school year in some specifications. I prefer to use 
year of birth, not year of entry to primary school, to define the longer school 
year, however, because year of birth is more reliable. People in developing 
countries like Indonesia may not always remember the year they were born, 
not to mention the year they entered primary schools. Enumerators of surveys 
in developing countries can check respondents’ birth certificates to verify the 
year of birth, something that they cannot do for year of entry to primary 
school. As Strauss et al. (2009b) explain, their respondents may give different 
birthdates in different books of IFLS so that they have to use an algorithm to 
increase the accuracy of year of birth in IFLS.  
I use two groups of outcomes: whether eligible voters voted in 
elections and factors they considered important when they voted for district 
heads.
9
 I examine participation in presidential and parliamentary (DPD, DPR, 
DPRD I, and DPRD II) elections.
10
 For factors that voters considered 
important when they voted, I examine whether they considered candidates’ 
look, popularity, quality of development programs, political affiliation, 
                                                          
9
 Administratively, Indonesia is divided into provinces; each province is then divided 
into districts. The heads of provinces are governors; the heads of districts are called 
bupati or walikota (mayors).  
10
 DPD stands for Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council), the 
upper house of the People's Consultative Assembly; DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
(People's Representative Council), the lower house. DPRD I and II are the local 
representative councils at the provincial- and district levels. 
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religion, ethnicity, experience in governance, gender, and gifts (“transport 
money”) given to voters important when they voted for district heads.11 Each 
variable is a dummy variable; for example, for participation in presidential 
elections, it equals one if an eligible voter voted and zero otherwise. 
The summary statistics in Table 2 does not show the expected effects 
of education on political participation. People in the younger cohorts were less 
likely to participate in elections though it may be driven by observations far 
away from the 1971 and 1972 birth cohorts. They were also more likely to 
consider political candidates’ quality of development programs or experiences 
in government important when they voted for district heads and less likely to 
consider candidates’ religion, look, or ethnicity. The RD design will, however, 
picks up differences in how educated people around the discontinuity between 
the 1971 and 1972 birth cohorts were, whether they participated in elections, 
and how they voted. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 It was customary for political candidates to give money to voters; the gifts were 
called “transport money” though voters did not necessarily use it to pay transportation 
costs to attend political rallies.  
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3. Results 
First, I discuss the effects of the longer school year on education (the first-
stage, second-stage, and reduced-form regressions). Then, I discuss the effects 
of education on political participation (the third-stage regressions). To 
conclude, I discuss some robustness checks. 
 
3.1. The effects of the longer school year on education 
The top graphs of Figure 1, which illustrate the first-stage regression, show a 
discontinuous relationship between the proportion of people who experienced 
the longer school year and year of birth: I can therefore use older cohorts (an 
indicator equals one for people who were born in 1971 or earlier) as an 
instrumental variable for longer school year in a fuzzy RD design.
12
 (It fits a 
fuzzy, not sharp, RD design because the discontinuity is in the probability of 
experiencing the longer school year conditional on year of birth.) Using year 
of birth to define longer school year (the top-left graph), the proportion drops 
from 100% for the 1971 birth cohort to zero for the 1972 cohort (and remains 
zero for the younger cohorts), but it smoothly decreases as we move from the 
1971 to 1960 cohorts (from 100% to about 0.2). (The 1972 and younger 
cohorts did not experienced the longer school year because they had yet to 
enter primary school when the government extended the longer school year; 
                                                          
12
 The graphs in Figures 1 and 2 and the estimates in Table 3 are similar to those in 
Parinduri (2014) who examines the effects of the longer school year on educational 
attainment and employment outcomes later in life 
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more people in the early 1960s cohorts did not experience the longer school 
year because the earlier the birth cohort a person was in, the more likely he 
was to drop out of school before 1978.) Using year of entry to primary school 
to define longer school year (the top-right graph), the proportion also drops 
between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts, from about 0.8 to 0.2; it smoothly 
decreases as we move from the 1971 to the1960 cohorts. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
The bottom graphs of Figure 1, which illustrate the reduced-form 
regression of the effects of the longer school year on education, show children 
that experienced the longer school year are better educated. Average 
educational attainment smoothly increases as we move from the 1960 birth 
cohort to the younger ones, but it drops between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts 
(the bottom-left graph), which correspond with the drop in the proportion of 
people who experienced the longer school year in the top graphs. (The trend 
line of the average educational attainment declines only for the 1980s cohorts.) 
The proportion of people who completed senior high school smoothly 
increases from 0.2 for the 1960 cohort to 0.5 for the 1980s cohorts (the 
bottom-left graph) but it also drops between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the estimates of 𝛽 in Equation (1) or the drop 
in the proportion of people who experienced the longer school year in the top-
graphs of Figure 1: The 1971-1972 cut-off is a strong predictor of whether 
somebody experienced the longer school year. Using year of birth to define 
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longer school year, people who were in the 1971 birth cohort were 100% more 
likely than people in the1972 cohort to experience the longer school year. 
Using year of entry to primary school to define longer school year, people in 
the 1971 cohort were 88% more likely to experience the longer school year 
(the sample size is smaller because some people did not report the year they 
entered primary school). The estimates are similar regardless of whether I 
control for year-of-birth cubic-polynomial function, age cubic-polynomial 
function, or gender and ethnicity dummies; all estimates are statistically 
significant.  
<Insert Table 3 here> 
The reduced-form estimates in Panel B, which are the estimates of the 
drop in the average educational attainment and the probability of completion 
of high school in the bottom graph of Figure 1, confirm people that 
experienced the longer school year are better educated. Average educational 
attainment drops by about 0.7 of a year between the 1971 and 1972 birth 
cohorts; the probability of completion of high schools drops by nine 
percentage points. (All estimates are statistically significant.)  
The second-stage estimates in Panel C show the economically large 
and statistically significant effects of the longer school year on education. The 
longer school year increased educational attainment by 0.7 of a year, a large 
increase, about eight percent (at the time the average educational attainment 
was nine years). It increased the probability of completion of high schools by 
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nine percentage points, also a large increase, about 21% (42% of people at the 
time completed high schools). This is the exogenous variation in education, 
induced by the longer school year, that I will use in the third-stage regressions 
to identify the effects of education on political participation. 
 
3.2. The effects of education on political participation 
Figure 2, which illustrates the reduced form estimates of the effects of the 
longer school year on political participation, does not seem to show that 
education matters. The trend lines are downward sloping for all types of 
elections (close to 100% for the 1960 birth cohorts and lower than 80% for the 
1987 birth cohorts), but they do not truncate between the 1971 and 1972 
cohorts. The older cohorts were more likely to vote than the younger cohorts 
(they were more likely to vote in presidential and parliamentary elections), but 
in all cases people in 1971 and 1972 birth cohorts, on both sides of the 
threshold, seem to be equally likely to vote—about 95% in presidential 
elections and 90% in DPR members elections. 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
Table 4 confirms the trends in Figure 2: Education positively correlates 
with political participation, but there is no evidence that education increased 
political participation. The reduced form estimates in column (1) are about one 
percentage point (except for presidential elections), which may be large in 
magnitude, but they are statistically insignificant. The effects of educational 
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attainment in column (2) are similar: The estimates are about 0.01 in most 
cases but the standard errors are bigger than the estimates. (An exception is the 
estimates of the effects education on presidential election, which are virtually 
zero.) The estimates of the effects of completing high school are about 5-10 
percentage points (except for presidential elections), but they are statistically 
insignificant with standard errors that are bigger than the estimates (column 
(3)). 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
Even though there is no evidence that education increased voter 
turnout, education positively correlates with voter turnout (except for 
participation in presidential elections) and the magnitude of the estimates is 
large. One more year of schooling is associated with one percentage point 
higher voter turnout; completion of high school, twelve years of education, is 
associated with 5-10 percentage point higher participation rates in DPD, DPR, 
and DPRD elections. Even though, using the results in Table 4, we cannot 
conclude that education improved voter turnout, perhaps we cannot ignore the 
high correlations either. 
 
3.3. The effects of education on how voters vote 
I now examine the effects of education on how voters vote—what factors that 
they considered important when they decided whom to vote for in elections of 
district heads. Figure 3 illustrates the reduced forms; Table 5 presents the 
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estimates of the reduced forms (column (1)), and the effects of educational 
attainment and completing high school (columns (2-3)). 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
Figure 3 and Table 5 show little evidence that education affected how 
people voted. The trend lines in Figure 3 do not seem to truncate between the 
1971 and 1972 birth cohorts except, perhaps, for political candidates’ quality 
of development programs. The estimates of the reduced form are about one 
percentage point and statistically insignificant except for candidates’ quality of 
programs, which is about four percentage points and statistically significant at 
the five percent level. Among the estimates of the effects of educational 
attainment and those of completing high school, only the estimates of the 
effects on candidates’ quality of programs that are statistically significant.13 
All other estimates are statistically insignificant, many with standard errors 
larger than the estimates. These other estimates of the effects of educational 
attainment are about one percentage point; those of completing high school 
about ten percentage points. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
The results, therefore, show little evidence that education made better 
voters. Completing high school decreased the relevance of political 
candidates’ religion and ethnicity by 20 and 12 percentage points, 
                                                          
13
 However, they are statistically insignificant if I use the Bonferroni correction. 
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respectively, which are about 30 and 100 percent decrease; but it also made 
gender and candidates’ gifts to voters eleven percentage points more 
important. None of the estimates is statistically significant, however, except 
for candidates’ quality of programs whose estimate is large, 46 percentage 
points or about 60 percent. (One more year of educational attainment 
increased the importance of candidates’ quality of programs by six percentage 
points, which is statistically significant at five percent level.) 
 
3.4. Robustness checks  
Table 6 presents some robustness checks in which I use various polynomial 
functions of the assignment variable and additional control variables. I add 
age-cubic polynomial as control (column (1)); I add gender and ethnicity 
dummies further (column (2)); I use quadratic polynomial function of the 
assignment variable instead of cubic function (column (3)); and I use quartic 
function instead (column (4)).  
<Insert Table 6 here> 
Overall, Table 6 shows similar results (I present the effects of 
completing high school on some outcomes only for brevity): Most of the 
estimates are statistically insignificant except the estimates of the effects 
education on whether voters considered political candidates’ quality of 
programs is important. The magnitude of the estimates is also similar. The 
estimate of the effects of education on participation is statistically insignificant 
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when I use year of birth quadratic polynomial of the assignment variable, but 
that is perhaps because the quadratic polynomial function under-fits the trend 
line.  
I also use (1) quarter of birth instead of year of birth as the assignment 
variable; (2) year of entry to primary schools to define longer school year; and 
(3) year of entry to primary school as the assignment variable (Figure 4 and 
Table 7). I use quarter of birth as the assignment variable to make people who 
were born around the discontinuity are more comparable. I use year of entry to 
primary school to define longer school year because some children entered 
primary school they year they turned six or eight years old. 
<Insert Figure 4 here> 
The results are also similar. All estimates are statistically insignificant 
except the effects on whether voters considered political candidates’ quality of 
programs important when they voted for district heads. It is only statistically 
insignificant when I use year of entry to primary school to define the longer 
school year, perhaps because data on year of entry to primary school is less 
accurate. In any case, the magnitude of the estimate is large and similar to that 
of the estimates in other specifications. 
<Insert Table 7 here> 
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4. Concluding remarks 
Educational attainment does not seem to increase political participation in 
Indonesia. Education does not make people more likely to vote in elections; it 
does make them vote better either: Education does not seem to change whether 
voters consider political candidates' religion, ethnicity, look, or gender 
important when they vote for district heads. If anything, education makes 
voters more likely to consider the "quality" of the candidates' programs 
important when they vote for district heads.  
These results indicate that education may not increase political 
participation in developing countries. The results are in line with some of the 
recent papers that use natural experiments to establish the causal relationship 
between education and political participation outside of the U.S. or Europe 
such as Solis (2013), who also uses an RD design. However, my results differ 
from Larreguy and Marshall’s (2015), one of the few papers that look at the 
relationship in developing countries, who find education increases voter 
turnout and possibly makes better voters (they use instrumental variable 
techniques). Still, it is difficult to reconcile my findings with Sondheimer and 
Green’s (2010) who, using randomized experiments in the U.S., show 
education increases voter turnout. 
 Even though I do not establish causal relationship between education 
and political participation, I find education and political participation strongly 
correlate even after I use the RD design to make people in the control and 
treated groups more comparable: Education positively correlates with both 
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voter turnout and some of the characteristics of good voters; in most cases, the 
correlations are also high. Perhaps education does not matter for political 
participation in Indonesia, but it is also possible that my results are statistically 
insignificant because the effects of education on political participation are 
small and that I do not have sufficient statistical power to reject the null 
hypothesis of no effect.  
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Figure 1 The longer school year and its effects on education 
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Figure 2 The effects of the longer school year on participation in the most recent elections 
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Figure 3 Factors considered in elections of district heads 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Year  of bir th
Appearance
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Year  of bir th
Quality of the program
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Year  of bir th
Religion
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Year  of bir th
Ethnicity
33 
 
 
Figure 4 Using quarter of birth as the assignment variable 
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Table 1 Falsification tests 
 
    
Dependent variable 
      
  (1) (2) 
Age (1) -0.01 -0.01 
  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Male (2) -0.02 -0.02 
  
(0.02) (0.02) 
Lived in rural areas when twelve years old (3) -0.02 -0.02 
  
(0.02) (0.02) 
Number of hours in schools per day (4) 0.01 0.03 
  
(0.06) (0.08) 
Time it took for a one-way trip to schools (5) 0.63 0.71 
  
(0.51) (0.61) 
Number of students in classrooms (6) -1.35 -1.14 
  
(1.05) (1.54) 
Variable used to define longer school year 
 
  
Year of birth 
 


Year of entry 
 


Notes: The number in each cell is the two-stage least square estimate of longer school 
year, which is defined using year of birth or year of entry to primary school. Each 
regression includes a year-of-birth cubic polynomial function. The dependent variables are 
listed on the left column; the figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by 
year of birth. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics 
    
Variable 
1960-1971 
cohorts 
1972-1987 
cohorts 
1960-1987 
cohorts 
A. Voted in the most recent election of …  
   
President 0.97 0.91 0.93 
 
(0.18) (0.29) (0.26) 
DPD 0.92 0.85 0.88 
 
(0.27) (0.36) (0.33) 
DPR 0.92 0.85 0.87 
 
(0.27) (0.36) (0.33) 
DPRD I 0.92 0.84 0.87 
 
(0.27) (0.36) (0.34) 
DPRD II 0.92 0.84 0.87 
 
(0.28) (0.36) (0.34) 
B. One of the most important factors considered in district-heads elections 
 
Appearance 0.19 0.18 0.18 
 
(0.39) (0.38) (0.38) 
Popularity 0.21 0.21 0.21 
 
(0.41) (0.40) (0.40) 
Quality of the program 0.75 0.78 0.77 
 
(0.43) (0.42) (0.42) 
Political affiliation 0.13 0.14 0.14 
 
(0.33) (0.35) (0.35) 
Religion 0.61 0.56 0.58 
 
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) 
Ethnicity 0.11  0.10  0.10  
 
(0.31) (0.30) (0.30) 
Experience in government 0.76  0.79  0.78  
 
(0.43) (0.41) (0.42) 
Male 0.06  0.06  0.06  
 
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
Gifts ("transport money") 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the mean; the figures in parentheses are the standard deviations. 
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Table 3 First-stage, reduced form, and second stage regressions 
        
  
    
  (1) (2) (3) 
A. First-stage regression 
    
1. Using year of birth to define longer school year 
    
Older cohorts (1) 1.02** 1.02** 1.02** 
  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.67 0.67 0.67 
Number of observations 
 
18,584 18,584 18,584 
2. Using year of entry to define longer school year 
    
Older cohorts (2) 0.88** 0.88** 0.88** 
  
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.65 0.65 0.65 
Number of observations 
 
16,735 16,735 16,735 
B. Reduced form 
    
1. Educational attainment 
    
Older cohorts (3) 0.69** 0.70** 0.66** 
2. Completed senior high school 
 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.20) 
Older cohorts (4) 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
C. 2SLS 
    
1. Educational attainment 
    
Older cohorts (5) 0.67** 0.68** 0.65** 
2. Completed senior high school 
 
(0.21) (0.20) (0.18) 
Older cohorts (6) 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Controls 
    
Year-of-birth cubic polynomial 
 
  
Age cubic polynomial 
 
 
Gender and ethnicity dummies 
  

Notes:  In Panel A, the number in each cell is the estimate of older cohorts from a regression of 
longer school year on older cohorts and a set of control variables. The longer school year equals one 
if an individual was born in 1971 or earlier and was still in school in 1978; it equals zero otherwise. 
Alternatively, the longer school year equals one if an individual entered a primary school in 1978 or 
earlier and was still in school in 1978. The number in each cell in Panel B is the reduced form 
estimate of longer school year defined using year of birth; that in Panel C is the corresponding 2SLS 
estimate. Older cohorts equals one if an individual was born in 1971 or earlier. The figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by year of birth. One and two stars indicate statistical 
significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 4 The effects of education on participation in elections 
 
     
Dependent variable 
  
Reduced     
form 
The effects of 
 
Educational 
attainment 
Completing 
high school 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Voted in the most recent election of … 
    
President (1) 0.001 -0.0004 -0.003 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) 
DPD (2) 0.0 0.01 0.05 
  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.14) 
DPR (3) 0.01 0.01 0.10 
  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.14) 
DPRD I (4) 0.01 0.01 0.10 
  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.14) 
DPRD II (5) 0.01 0.01 0.08 
  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.14) 
Notes: The number in each cell in column (1) is the estimate of older cohorts in a regression of a 
measure of political participation on older cohorts and a year-of-birth cubic polynomial function. The 
number in each cell in columns (2-3) is the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimate of the effects of 
educational attainment and completing high school on political participation. The dependent variables 
are listed on the left column. Older cohorts equals one if an individual was born in 1971 or earlier. 
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a 
level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 5 The effects of education on factors voters considered when they voted 
 
     
Dependent variable 
  
Reduced     
form 
The effects of 
 
Educational 
attainment 
Completing 
high school 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Appearance (1) -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 
  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.16) 
Popularity (2) 0.01 0.02 0.15 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.17) 
Quality of the program (3) 0.04* 0.06* 0.46** 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.18) 
Political affiliation (4) -0.001 -0.003 -0.02 
  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.14) 
Religion (5) -0.02 -0.03 -0.20 
  
(0.01) (0.03) (0.20) 
Ethnicity (6) -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 
  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.12) 
Experience in government (7) -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.17) 
Male (8) 0.01 0.01 0.11 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.10) 
Gifts ("transport money") (9) 0.01 0.01 0.11 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.10) 
Notes: The number in each cell in column (1) is the estimate of older cohorts in a regression of a 
characteristic of political candidates on older cohorts and a year-of-birth cubic polynomial function. 
Each cell in columns (2-3) is the corresponding equation-by-equation 2SLS estimate of the effects of 
educational attainment and completing high school, respectively. The dependent variables are listed on 
the left column. Older cohorts equals one if an individual was born in 1971 or earlier. The figures in 
parentheses are standard errors. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and 
one percent, respectively. 
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Table 6 Using other polynomial functions of the assignment variable and other control 
variables 
 
Dependent variable 
    The effects of completing high school 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Voted in the most recent election of …  
 
     
… President (1) 
 
-0.004 -0.01 -0.17* -0.16 
  
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) 
… DPR (2)  
0.10 0.10 -0.14 -0.06 
  
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) 
B. … is one of the most important factors considered in district-heads elections   
Quality of program (3)  
0.46* 0.45* 0.31* 0.33 
  
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.17) 
Religion (4)  
-0.20 -0.15 -0.09 -0.13 
  
 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.15) (0.20) 
Controls 
      
Year-of-birth quadratic polynomial 
   


Year-of-birth cubic polynomial 
 
 
 
Year-of-birth quartic polynomial 
    

Age cubic polynomial 
 
 
 
Gender and ethnicity dummies 
  

 
Notes: The number in each cell is the the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimate of the effects of completing high 
school. The dependent variables in the third-stage are listed in the left column; the controls are listed in the 
bottom rows. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. One and two stars indicate statistical significance 
at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 7 Using quarter of birth or year of entry to primary school as the assignment variable 
 
      
Dependent variable 
  
Voted in the most recent 
election of … 
… is one of the most 
important factors 
considered in district-heads 
elections 
 
 
… President … DPR 
Quality of 
the program 
Religion 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. Assignment variable: quarter of birth 
     
Longer school year (using year of birth) (1) 0.02 0.14 0.46* -0.20 
  
(0.11) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20) 
2. Assignment variable: year of birth 
     Longer school year (using year of entry) (2) -0.01 0.14 0.55** -0.20 
  
(0.11) (0.15) (0.19) (0.21) 
3. Assignment variable: year of entry 
     Longer school year (using year of entry) (3) -0.21 0.15 0.59 0.06 
  
(0.22) (0.28) (0.38) (0.41) 
Notes: The number in each cell is the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimate of the effects of completing high 
school. The dependent variables in the third stage are listed in the top row. The figures in parentheses are 
standard errors. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
 
 
